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The American Bar Association, along with other similar organizations,
has had a long-standing interest in the protection of the foreign investments
of United States nationals. Following the rash of postwar nationalizations,
the question generating most debate has been whether states nationalizing
such investments are required to pay compensation under customary in-
ternational law.
Five years ago, in a definitive report on The Compensation Requirement
in the Taking of Alien Property, the Committee on International Law of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York answered the question
affirmatively, concluding that "an absence of compensation alone should
be held to constitute an international wrong."1 The Committee made no
attempt, however, to define the amount of compensation required by in-
ternational law, nor did it discuss the standards to be used in its computa-
tion. The nationalization of United States copper companies by the Repub-
lic of Chile in 1971 affords opportunity to explore both these issues in
preliminary fashion.
Historically, the first real debate over the amount of compensation to be
paid when a country nationalizes the property of foreigners began in the
1920s, but the discussion has reached new intensities of heat, if not of light,
during the past quarter century.2 In the United States, for instance, advo-
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'22 THE RECORD 195, 204 (1967).
2Compare Fachiri, Expropriation and International Law, 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 159
(1925), with Williams, International Law and the Property of Aliens, 9 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. I
(1928). See also Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1961).
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cates of "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation, and proponents
of "partial" compensation locked horns over the Sabbatino case,3 a deci-
sion which at the very least confused rather than clarified this highly
controversial question.4
Indeed, in the United States and elsewhere the debate has suffered from
what one might call "the fallacy of the meticulous jurist," namely, the
belief of rule-oriented participants of varying views that order could be
brought out of chaos if only international law could be shown either to
require or not to require the payment of a certain amount of compensation
upon the nationalization of foreign property.
In large measure, this debate has misconceived the key issue in dispute,
for among governments and claimants alike, as Sweeney has perceptively
observed, "[t]he disagreement in this area is not with respect to the re-
quirement of compensation. It is centered on the manner in which the
value of the property is determined. ' 5 This issue, unfortunately, has re-
ceived little or no attention from jurists, meticulous or otherwise, despite
Sweeney's warning that "the future settlement of any of the difficult prob-
lems raised by takings of property in the modern world must be solved
eventually by working out agreed methods of valuation of property. "6
As Rogers points out in his Foreword to a recently-published volume of
essays on the subject, the avoidance of the above task and the continued
invocation of general principles will only "obscure thought, comfort the
parties with notions of ideological certainty and moral perfection, and
inspire them to dig their trenches deeper. The actual issues in real life are
too complex, the cases to be decided, and the precedents of decision, too
disparate and unique for easy, simple principles."7
3Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).4See generally R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: SIX PROCEDUR-
AL STUDIES 69-97 (1965), and EXPROPRIATION IN THE AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE LAW
STUDY ch. XV (A. Lowenfeld ed. 1971).5Sweeney, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and the
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 762, 764 (1965): "The
common mistake in this area is to confuse problems of valuation with the principle that just
compensation is due. The discrepancy between the value claimed for the property by the
owner and the value claimed for it by the state which is acting for a public purpose only shows
disagreement with respect to calculation. It does not show disagreement with respect to the
principle of just compensation. Compensation for property taken substantially lower in
amount than the compensation claimed does not prove that just compensation was not given."
Id. at 768.61d. at 767.7Rogers, Foreword to THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW at viii (R. Lillich ed. & contrib. 1972). For another attempt to survey the
process and the standards of valuation in "real life," see Panel Discussion, The Taking of
Property: Evaluation of Damages, 62 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS35-57 (1968). See
also R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR BRITISH PRACTICE ch. VI (1967), and
B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POSTWAR FRENCH PRACTICE 178-82 (1971), for a
discussion of valuation by British and French national claims commissions.
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Given past experience, then, the legal standards established by Chile last
year to govern its nationalization of United States copper companies came,
jurisprudentially at least, as something of a surprise. Rogers rightly notes
that Chile "made every effort to disarm its critics by recognizing the right
in principle of the foreign investor to recover the value of his nationalized
property, but reserving for scrupulous later analysis the question of
amount .... 8
Indeed, even a cursory examination of the Constitutional Amendment
Concerning Natural Resources and Their Nationalization of July 15,
1971, 9 reveals the accuracy of the New York Times' characterization of
President Allende as "a radical with a flair for legal niceties .... -0
Although subsequent rhetoric, most notably portions of the President's
Decree Concerning Excess Profits of Copper Companies of September 28,
197 1,11 somewhat beclouds the issues, the legal standards governing the
recent nationalizations and the methods of valuing the assets of the com-
panies taken thereunder are susceptible of legal analysis and serious cri-
tique to an extent that the Cuban nationalizations, for instance, were not.
12
These legal standards, it is fair to say, introduce "a variety of new legal
concepts that reduce the potential valuation of the properties." 13 In the
first place, the Comptroller General of Chile, who is made responsible for
determining the amount of compensation that should be paid, is required to
base his valuation solely upon "the book value as of December 3 1,
1970,"14 less certain deductions to be mentioned briefly below. 15
8 Rogers, supra note 7.
9The Constitutional Amendment is reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1067
(1971).
10N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, § E, at 3, col. 6.
"The Decree is reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1235 (1971). Its flavor is
reflected in the following paragraph:
On this occasion of determining the amount of compensation to correspond to the
nationalization, after decades of exploitation the people of Chile now assert their right to
have the principles of equity applied in favor of the national community. In the pre-
servation of their patrimony, in the defense of their inherent right of economic sover-
eignty- historically violated by the copper enterprises-the people of Chile have earned
their rights against these companies, which today they legally and logically exercise by
deducting the excessive profits obtained by the nationalized enterprises.
Jd. at 1237.
"2The Cuban nationalizations, "based upon a totally illusory funding system and payable
in bonds that were never printed," so patently violated international law that serious analysis
was unnecessary. See Dawson, Current Decisions, 8 ABA INT'L & CoMP. L. BULL. No. 2 at
28, 33 (1964).
13 N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 197 1, at 2, col. 5.
'
4Constitutional Amendment, supra note 9, at 1068. Additionally, -[the amount of the
compensation ... shall be determined on the basis of the original cost of such assets, less
amortization, depreciation, write-offs (castigos), and devaluation through obsolescence." Id. at
1067. See text and accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
"sSee text at notes 33-45 infra.
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Exclusive reliance upon book value, of course, occasionally may permit
a just result in a given nationalization.Y6 Generally, as a speaker at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in 1968
graphically demonstrated, such is not the case.'7 In the case of the copper
companies, the constitutionally mandated use of the book value test, to the
exclusion of other more reliable methods of valuation, has produced a
compensation figure arguably below the amount required by international
law.
The long-standing position of the United States, reiterated recently by
Whiteman, is that "[iln the case of an operating enterprise, adequate
compensation is usually considered to be an amount representing the
market value or 'going concern' value of the enterprise, calculated as if the
expropriation or other governmental act decreasing the value of the busi-
ness had not occurred and was not threatened."' 8 This position accords
with such international precedents as the Lena Goldfields arbitration,
where the value of a nationalized mining enterprise was based upon its
"fair purchase price as a going concern."' 19
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, with
probably more experience valuating nationalized companies than any other
tribunal, has rejected arguments that it rigidly apply the book value test.2 0
In Claim of the First National Bank of Boston,2 ' for instance, it rejected
its previous presumption in favor of book value, and rendered its decision
on a going-concern basis.
The Commission held that
the nature of the business conducted is such that earnings potential reflected
in the market price of the stock is of greater significance than asset value in
the determination of true value of the enterprise at any given time. The
'
6 The difference between book value and "real or going concern value is, of course, far
greater in the case of a mining property which has been in operation for an extended period of
time than in the case of a mining property which is relatively new or in the case of other
businesses which have relatively short-lived assets, or assets whose depreciated costs ap-
proach current values. Thus, in the case of some businesses, application of provisions in the
expropriation legislation might not produce a result which would be a major departure from
accepted international compensation standards." KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, Ex-
PROPRIATION OF EL TENIENTE 86(1971).
17While the book value of General Motors Corporation at the end of 1962 was
$6,367,407,22 1, the market value of its shares was over $17 billion. Panel Discussion, supra
note 7, at 38.
188 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1143 (1967).
19Quoted from KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, supra note 16, at 74. See generally
Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between Lena Goldfields, Ltd., and the Soviet Government, 36
CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950).20See Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property by the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, in THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 7, at 95, 105- 15.2 1 FCSC, Ann, Rep. 33 (1969).
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Commission is persuaded that at the time of loss the claimant's six Cuban
branches had a value exceeding their book value ... 22
Subsequent decisions of the Commission frequently use the capital-
ization-of-earnings method of determining going concern value, applying a
multiple of from 1023 to 1524 to the annual net earnings after taxes. In
Claim of Sun Oil Co.,25 a special mining concession case, it even adopted a
multiple of 162/3.
The fact that the book value approach generally produces figures lower
than the above methods of valuation, lends credence to the statement by
Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
that for a going concern the book value test may be "a dubious measure of
true worth .... ,26
Since, as William Blake is purported to have warned, "to generalize is to
be an idiot," prudence dictates that Meyer's statement be tested in the
Chilean context. In contrast to most nationalizations, in which firm data is
hard to come by, the Kennecott Copper Corporation and the Republic of
Chile have made ample information available from which at least tentative
conclusions may be drawn.
According to the Comptroller General, as of December 31, 1970, the
basic book value of the El Teniente Mining Company, a 49 percent owned
subsidiary of Kennecott, was approximately $365 million, 27 a figure the
company appears willing to accept.2 8 Moreover, Kennecott has acknowl-
edged that it is "approximately the same figure derived by applying the
customary valuation tests for mineral properties as going concerns .... -29
While it has called this figure "conservative, "30 pointing out that by
applying "realistic capitalization multiples to the over $20 million divi-
221d. at 36.23Claim of General Dynamics Corp., Dec. No. CU-3787 (Aug. 27, 1969).24Claim of Colgate-Palmolive Co., Dec. No. CU-4547 (Feb. 3, 1971). A summary of the
decision appears in Evans (ed.),Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law,
65 AM.J. INT'L L. 627 (1971).25Dec. No. CU-4706 (April 8, 1970).26N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1971, at 6, col. 6.
27Brief for Kennecott Copper Corporation, Special Copper Tribunal (Dec. 2, 1971),
reprinted in KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, CONFISCATION OF EL TENIENTE 9, 52
(Supp. No. 2 1972) [hereinafter cited as Brief].
28 KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, CONFISCATION OF EL TENIENTE 9 (Supp. 197 1).
The company earlier had claimed a book value of $362.4 million. KENNECOTT COPPER
CORPORATION, supra note 16, at 83.29 1d. at 83. "Using the internationally-recognized standards for valuing mining property
which were followed by the Lena Goldfields tribunal, the present value of Braden's 49 percent
equity investment in El Teniente, reduced by the 30 percent Chilean dividend tax, is esti-
mated at $175,884,000, assuming a 15 percent risk rate, a 4 percent safe or redemption rate,
and a $.24 cost/price spread for copper." Id. see text at note 19 supra.
311d. Compare text accompanying note 32 infra.
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dends... the going concern value for El Teniente based on earnings would
be something on the order of $ 1 billion,'31 Kennecott has made no real
attempt to substantiate the latter valuation, and the impression exists that it
could live with book value compensation despite its inadequacy under
international law. 32
The Comptroller General, however, reduced the book value figure to
$319 million, deducting from the balance sheet items for payment of
retirement indemnization to workers,33 for contributions to the cost of
constructing houses for company personnel,3 4 and for the difference in
value of mining deposits.35
These deductions, presently on appeal to the Special Copper Tribunal,
may or may not be permissible modifications under good accountancy
principles, but surely if such deductions are allowed from book value then
additions, say for appreciation by reason of inflation, should be permitted
too. The one-sidedness of Chile's invocation of the book value approach,
even more than its general inadequacy, brings the Comptroller General's
$319 million valuation perilously close to minimal compensation.
The provisions in the Constitutional Amendment authorizing the Comp-
troller General to subtract from this reduced book value compensation
"any revaluations made by ... [the] companies or their predecessors after
December 3 I, 1964,"136 plus "those amounts representing assets that the
State fails to receive in good operating condition," 37 have been utilized to
deduct $198 million for revaluations and $21 million for deficient in-
stallations,38 reducing the balance of compensation due Kennecott to $100
million.
Both these deductions, also on appeal to the Special Copper Tribunal, 39
conceivably could be justified as relevant to the determination of adequate
compensation, but they are subject to the same general criticism leveled at
the first three deductions.
31id. "Even this figure does not take into account the increased profitability of El
Teniente based upon the 1967-1972 expansion program which, although substantially accom-
plished by early 197 1, had not been reflected in actual production increases through 1970."
Id. 321ndeed, it has stated that "the acceptance of book figures at December 3 1, 1970, would
approach the true value of El Teniente as a going concern." Id. at 87. Compare text at note 30
supra.73See Brief 10- 12.34See Brief 13- 15.35See Brief 14- 15.36Constitutional Amendment, supra note 9, at 1069.
371d.
38The Comptroller General's Resolution on Compensation of October II, 1971, is
reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1240 (1971). See id. at 1252, for the deductions
given in the text.39See Brief 16-41.
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Finally, and this provision may be regarded as the proverbial straw that
broke the camel's back, the Constitutional Amendment specifically em-
powered the President of Chile to order the Comptroller General, in
computing the compensation, to deduct alleged "excess profits" retroactive
to 1955.40
According to Kennecott, "[t]he provision on 'excess profits' has no
foundation in generally accepted principles of international law as recog-
nized by the United States. There were no 'excess profits' under the laws
of Chile in effect at the time profits were earned and dividends paid. The
insertion of an excess profits recapture provision in the expropriation
legislation is tantamount to confiscation unless that provision is found to be
inapplicable under the circumstances.1 41
Unfortunately for the company, President Allende found it applicable
and ordered the Comptroller General to deduct $410 million from Kenne-
cott's compensation balance of $100 million, 42 leaving the company with
no prospects of any compensation whatsoever. 43
Since the alleged "excess profits" exceeded Kennecott's earnings from
Chile during the 15-year period, 44 it is hard to construe the provision and
the President's action under it as anything but nationally-authorized in-
ternational confiscation. This characterization, uncharitable as it may
sound, finds support in the fact that there is no appeal from the President's
order to the Special Copper Tribunal, much less to the regular courts of
law 5
In sum, Chile, by recognizing its obligation to pay adequate com-
pensation to foreigners for their nationalized property, initially inspired the
hope that a Marxist regime in a country with a strong legal tradition could
reorder its economy without provoking an international uproar that would
redound to its own economic and political detriment.
While some of the provisions in the Constitutional Amendment govern-
ing the nationalization of the copper companies considerably dimmed this
hope, it has been extinguished, in the eyes of many observers, by what the
New York Times has called President Allende's "bizarre bookkeeping
maneuver" over "excess profits."'46
40Constitutional Amendment, supra note 9, at 1069.
41 KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, supra note 16, at 88.42President's Decree, supranote II, at 1240.
43Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 38, at 1253. Since no compensation is
likely to be paid in the event, it is unnecessary to consider whether the form of payment
contemplated, "the term not to exceed thirty years, and the interest not to be less than 3
percent per annum," complies with international law. Constitutional Amendment, sitpra note
9, at 1069.
44 KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, CONFISCATION OF EL TENIENTE 4 (Supp. 197 1).45Constitutional Amendment, supra note 9, at 1069.
46N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1971, at 28, col. 2.
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Unhappily, his action in this regard has created a political storm which
obscures the important issues concerning the valuation of nationalized
property raised, if not yet answered, by the Chilean nationalizations.
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